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Abstract
The "traditional structural approach" to the determination of real
commodity prices has relied exclusively on demand factors as the
fundamentals that explain the behavior of commodity prices. This framework,
however, has been unable to explain the marked and sustained weakness in
commodity prices during the 1980s and 1990s. This paper extends that
framework in two important directions: First, it incorporates commodity
supply in the analysis, capturing the impact on prices of the sharp increase
in commodity exports of developing countries during the debt crisis of the
1980s. Second, we take a broader view of "world" demand that extends beyond
the industrial countries and includes output developments In Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union (FSU). The empirical results support these
extensions, as both the fit of the model improves substantially and, more
importantly, its ability to forecast increases markedly.
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I. Introduction
Commodity markets play a central role in transmitting disturbances
internationally by linking industrial commodity-importing countries to
developing commodity suppliers. Given the marked fluctuations in both
prices and volumes in recent years, this role as a conduit of shocks
suggests that a comprehensive analysis of the macroeconomic factors having
an impact on this market must be incorporated in the design of policy,
particularly for those countries that rely heavily on primary commodity
exports and that are facing substantial terms-of-trade shocks. Further, the
need to understand the factors that influence the behavior of commodity
prices has taken on a new urgency in recent years, as non-oil commodity
prices have fallen sharply and persistently in real terms since the early
1980s. While this decline affects all commodity-producing countries in some
measure, those with the least diversified production structure suffer the
largest impact. 1/ Moreover, this latter group of countries tends to
have loss flexible economic systems, making substitution away from commodity
production more difficult or costly, and encompasses many of the poorest
countries in the world.
The conventional analysis of commodity markets mimics the empirical
strategy applied to other key macroeconomic variables--namely, to try to
identify a stable and predictable relationship between commodity prices and
two or three macroeconomic variables. While markets for individual
commodities are affected by a variety of specific factors in their day-to-
day evolution, the aggregate index of non-oil commodities has been treated
as a macroeconomic variable whose movements, on a quarterly or annual basis,
are related to prevailing macroeconomic conditions. Studies that have
stressed a structural approach to commodity price determination have found
that two (demand-side) variables did well in explaining the variation of
commodity prices: the state of the business cycle in industrial countries
and the real exchange rate of the U.S. dollar. 2/ This line of research,
including the work of Dornbusch (1985), Morrison and Chu (1984 and 1986)
and, more recently, Gilbert (1989), generally involve partial equilibrium
models that treat the determinants of commodity prices (both conceptually
and empirically) as exogenous. During the early 1980s, industrial
production in the industrial countries was weak, as several countries
experienced prolonged and deep recessions, and the dollar appreciated by
nearly 50 percent in real terms. In this setting, the "demand-driven"
framework explained much of the observed weakness in real commodity
prices. 3/ In the post-1984 period, however, despite a weakening dollar
and a substantial rebound in the growth of output of several of the major
industrial countries, real commodity prices remained soft, puzzling many
commodity market analysts and further worsening the predicament of the large
1/ See for example, Reinhart and Wickham (1993).
2/ The role of the real exchange rate of the U.S. dollar in this
framework is to correct for the fact that commodity prices are measured by a
dollar-denominated index and deflated by a dollar-denominated price index,
whereas the relevant measure for the non-U.S. industrial countries Is the
price of commodities relative to output prices in those countries.
3/ Real commodity prices fell by 31 percent In that period.
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number of developing economies that are primary commodity exporters (see
Morrison and Wattleworth, (1987)). By late 1984, the "demand-driven"
framework began to systematically overpredict real commodity prices by wide
margins and the forecasts have continued to be off-track up to the present.
This persistent overprediction, in turn, suggested that one or more
important variables were being left out of the analysis.
A number of reasons have been put forward to explain the persistent
weakness in commodity prices in the post-1984 period, essentially on the
basis of anecdotal evidence rather than on the basis of a formal systematic
approach. For instance, the response in developing countries to the debt
crisis of the 1980s and the economic developments in the economies in
transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) more recently
stand out as major shocks that are thought to have had considerable impact
on international commodity markets. Specifically, it has been argued that
the acceleration in primary commodity supplies since the mid-1980s has been
a byproduct of the debt crisis, as developing countries expanded commodity
exports in an attempt to service burgeoning debt obligations (see, for
instance, Aizenman and Borensztein (1988) and Gilbert (1989)). With respect
to the economies in transition, the impact on the international commodity
market has come through two channels: weaker demand, as incomes and
consumption have fallen dramatically in recent years, and a sharp increase
in the supply of several primary commodities. The contraction in demand is
reflected in the sharp declines in imports of a broad spectrum of
commodities, while the supply effect is evident in the staggering increases
in FSU exports of various metals. 1/
The purpose of this paper is to identify the main economic fundamentals
that lie behind the behavior of commodity prices, particularly the recent
weakness, and quantify how the relative importance of each of these factors
has evolved over time. We extend the "traditional structural approach"
described above by incorporating these two important developments in
international commodity markets of the 1980s and 1990s. The empirical
analysis is based on quarterly data for 1970:1-1992:3. As in the
theoretical model outlined in Reinhart (1991), we incorporate commodity
supplies as a determinant of commodity prices, thus capturing the impact on
prices of the sharp increase in the commodity exports of the developing
countries. In addition, we take a broader view of "world" aggregate demand
that extends beyond the major industrial countries and includes output
developments in Eastern Europe and the FSU.
The main results can be summarized as follows: first, as predicted by
theory, the constructed commodity supply index affects commodity prices in a
negative and predictable manner. The inclusion of this measure of supply
markedly improves the fit of the structural model and, more importantly,
significantly reduces the out-of-sample overprediction of real commodity
1/ Other less quantifyable factors depressing real commodity prices, such
as the breakdown of numerous international commodity agreements are
discussed in Reinhart and Wickham (1993).
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prices that have plagued "demand-driven" structural models since the mid-
1980s. In effect, supply developments appear to account for the bulk of the
variation in real commodity prices during the 1985-1988 period. Secondly,
while output in Eastern Europe and the FSU appears to have played a
relatively minor role over the entire sample period (1971-1992), adding
little to the overall fit of the model or to the model's predictive ability
prior to 1989, these developments acquired an increasingly important role in
the more recent period. When this broader measure of world demand is
employed the problem of systematic overprediction disappears altogether. In
addition, decompositions confirm that the relative importance of
developments in the transition economies in accounting for the variability
in real commodity prices more than quadrupled in the post 1988 period.
More generally, estimates using quarterly data suggest that while the full
structural model does not outperform a random walk forecast of real
commodity prices for short-term forecast horizons (one- to four-quarters
ahead), the structural model outperforms the random walk predictions over a
longer-term forecast horizon (five to 31 quarters) and captures the major
turning points in real commodity prices during the 1985-1992 period.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II summarizes some of the
stylized facts on recent developments in commodity prices and their
potential determinants; the focus is on documenting supply conditions and
discussing the relevant developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Section III provides the theoretical structure that forms the basis for the
empirical part of the analysis, which is presented in Section IV. The
empirical section discusses some of the problems of the earlier models. It
is shown that the single equation approach adopted by Dornbusch (1985 and
1986) and others (see Englander (1985) for a review of this literature)
suffers from both misspecification and simultaneity bias. Proxies for world
commodity supply and for demand in the transition economies are then
included as determinants of real commodity prices. The section assesses the
robustness of the proposed structural model by comparing its out-of-sample
forecasting performance to a "naive" model a la Meese and Rogoff (1983) and
concludes by examining how the relative importance of the macroeconomic
determinants has evolved over time.
II. Developments in Commodity Prices
The decline in the prices of non-oil commodities in real terms in the
past decade has been remarkable. By mid 1993, the relative price of non-oil
commodities had declined 42 percent relative to 1980, and 63 percent
relative to its peak in early 1974 (top panel, Chart 1). 1/ From an
historical perspective, the decline is also exceptional. In 1982, the
relative price of non-oil commodities went below its previous historical
1/ We measure the relative price of non-oil commodities as the IMF all-
commodity index deflated by the U.S. GNP deflator. Both indices are in
U.S. dollars. Different measures of the commodities price index or the
deflator do not alter the outlook significantly.
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minimum of 1932, and presently is at its lowest level in over ninety years.
While market conditions vary from one commodity to another, Reinhart and
Wickham (1994) show that the downward trend has been quite generalized,
which suggests that common factors have been responsible for the price
decline.
As the top panel of Chart 1 illustrates, the other prominent
development in the recent evolution of commodity markets is that the decline
in prices has been accompanied by a vigorous growth in the volume of imports
of non-oil commodities by industrial countries. 1/ Since 1983, this
volume index has almost doubled, even though, during the same period, GDP of
the industrial nations grew less than 30 percent. 2/ Imports of non-oil
commodities also grew faster than those of other goods, as world imports of
all types of goods increased by approximately 70 percent in real terms
during the same period. This large increase in the volume of commodity
production and trade suggests the importance of supply-side factors in
explaining price developments. A perusal of Chart 1 suggests that the
decline in prices of the 1980s and 1990s cannot be explained by an inward
shift in the demand for commodities alone, and that the rapid outward shifts
in available supply must have played an important role.
In the case of developing countries, a number of factors contributed to
the expansion in supply. The unfolding of the debt crisis in the early
1980s confronted many developing countries with considerably more restricted
borrowing opportunities in international financial markets. This situation
required balance of payments adjustments, which brought about policies
geared to encouraging exports, expanding commodity supplies in many
developing countries. During the midst of the debt crisis, (1984-88) world
commodity supply grew at an annual rate of 13 percent, or about three times
as fast as the 4.8 percent annual rate of growth of the previous ten years.
Moreover, the process of structural reforms started by many developing
countries in the later part of the 1980s also had a positive impact on
commodity supplies. In particular, countries opened their economies to
international trade and adjusted their economic policies in a more market-
1/ World commodity supply is an unobserved variable, and most likely, any
constructed proxy for it (including the one used here) is subject to
measurement error. However, the principal reason for using an index of the
volume of commodity imports of the industrial countries as a measure of
supply rather than, say, recorded exports of primary commodities from
developing countries is the accessibility and reliability of the data.
According to the country classification strategy used in the World Economic
Outlook, there are 130 developing countries (of which 68 are non-oil
commodity exporters). Since both the timeliness and reliability of the data
vary markedly across such a large set of countries, especially at quarterly
frequencies, it is expected that this diversity will exacerbate the
measurement error problem.
2/ This increase in world commodity supplies is further corroborated by
the sharp increase in agricultural yields in both developed and developing
countries in recent years (see Reinhart and Wickham (1993)).
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Chart 1. Factors Affecting Commodity Markets
Commodity Prices
and World Commodity Supply
Alternative Measures of World Demand
Sources: Commodity Research Bureau, International Financial Statistics,
World Economic Outlook, and the authors.
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oriented direction. Resources have flowed towards productive sectors with
comparative advantage, which include exportable goods and, in the case of
many developing countries, primary products. Further, as noted earlier,
technological developments also appear to have played a key role in boosting
primary-commodity output, particularly of several agricultural commodities.
Since 1990, a second major shock affected commodity markets, namely,
the aftermath of economic developments in Eastern Europe and, particularly,
the FSU. Taken together these countries are large participants in commodity
markets both in the demand side (mostly grains and other foodstuffs) and the
supply side (especially in metals). Their demand for imported commodities
fell concomitantly with the fall in output and aggregate demand that
followed the collapse of their centrally-planned economic systems. Some
examples of the decline in imports of commodities by the FSU are shown in
Table 1. As the bottom panel of Chart 1 makes plain, there was little
difference up to and including 1988 between a measure of aggregate demand
that included the economies in transition and the more often-used measure
that focuses on western industrial countries. Hence, a priori, one would
not expect any substantive differences in the econometric results by using
one or the other measure. Since 1989, owing to the output collapse in the
transition economies, however, these two indices paint a very different
picture of aggregate demand conditions. The industrial country index
suggests a flat, lackluster performance while the more comprehensive measure
signals a recession comparable in magnitude to the recession following the
first oil shock in 1973 and the more recent downturn in the early 1980s.
However, the impact of economic developments in Eastern Europe and the
FSU on international commodity markets has not been limited to a reduction
in their demand for primary commodities. In effect, some of the more
substantial effects appear to have been on commodity exports, especially
in the metals markets, where the FSU is an important supplier. As can be
seen in Table 2, this supply increase mostly reflected the sharp decline
in domestic demand, which responded to the declines in the level of
activity in the defense industry and in poorly competitive manufactures,
and to disruptions in interrepublican trade. Other factors may have also
contributed to the increase in the volume of exports of metals:
(1) increased profitability in energy-intensive metals production and
exports, owing to the still very low domestic price of energy, (2) arbitrage
opportunities arising from discrepancies between domestic and international
prices in the context of partial price and trade liberalization, (3) a
reduction in stock levels that are no longer justified from national
security or economic standpoints, and (4) export activity linked to capital
flight. Overall, the increase in exports of metals and the fall in imports
of some grains and other commodities since 1989 have contributed to the
observed weakness in the aggregate prices of primary products.
These stylized facts provide clues for the econometric investigation.
While the macroeconomic conditions in industrial countries have
traditionally been considered the main determinant of commodity prices
developments, it seems evident that other forces have played a significant
role over the recent past. Based on the arguments made in this section, it
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Table 1. Demand of the Former Soviet Union for Selected Commodities
Import Percent change FSU imports as a share of
volumes of: 1989-92 world imports: 1989
(percent)
Cocoa 1/ -48.1 4.8
Corn -62.7 26.0
Tea -55.7 26.9
Wheat 2/ -17.0 21.3
Source: International Tea Committee and World Grain Situation and Outlook.
1/ Grindings of raw cocoa (closer to consumption rather than imports).
2/ Percent change is through November of 1993.
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Table 2. Supply from the Former Soviet Union of Selected Commodities
Exports of:
Percent Change
1989-92
FSU exports as a share of
world exports: 1992
(percent)
Aluminum
Copper
Zinc
219.4
71.2
686.0
8.3
5.4
2.2
Source: World Metal Statistics
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appears necessary to include a supply variable to account for the booming
exports of primary products (Morrison and Wattleworth (1987) using annual
data also consider supply effects), and to take into account the change in
the demand for commodities of the FSU.
III. A Framework
In the analysis that follows it is assumed that the commodity is
nonstorable and internationally traded. There are three countries (or
country blocks), two of these are industrial commodity importers, and the
third country can be thought of as a developing commodity supplier.
1. Demand for commodities
The demand for commodities is usually formulated as the demand for an
input that is used for the production of final goods. Two countries demand
commodities as inputs: the United States and an aggregate of the rest of
the industrial countries. Production in each one of these two countries
takes place under a Cobb-Douglas technology. By duality, the cost function
corresponding to that technology is the following:
where y is the level of output in the United States, q is the price of non-
oil commodity inputs relative to the price of United States output, and A is
a constant. Ω is given by:
Where the wi represent real product prices of all the other inputs and
factors used in production. Similarly, for the other industrial countries,
the dual cost function is given by:
where R is the ratio of the price of United States output to the output of
other industrial countries (the real exchange rate of the U.S. dollar) and
variables with a star superscript have the same definition as in the United
States case but correspond to the "other industrial country" grouping.
Conditional factor demands can then be obtained by the corresponding partial
derivative of the cost functions. Therefore, the demand for commodities by
the United States and other industrial countries will be given by:
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2. Supply and market clearing
An aggregate of developing countries produce and export the commodity,
the supply of which is assumed to be fixed at a point in time. In this
simplest framework, we do not attempt to formulate an aggregate supply
function for commodities, largely because of the diversity of economic
conditions in the broad spectrum of producer countries. Further, past
studies have had limited success in endogenizing supply. For instance, one
of the important determinants of the supply increase for a set of developing
countries was the debt crisis in the 1980s, which forced them to improve
returns to commodity exporters, among other adjustments. Gilbert (1989)
tried to capture this effect by using the debt service ratio for a group of
developing countries as an explanatory variable for commodity prices, but
had very limited success. One problem is that while the debt crisis
provided the backdrop for efforts to increase exports of commodities,
indicators such as debt-to-GDP ratios do not provide good proxies for the
incentives offered to commodity suppliers on a quarterly basis. It is also
the case that developing countries in Asia, without debt-servicing
difficulties, have liberalized their trade regimes and improved export
incentives. In addition, as noted in Reinhart and Wickham (1994),
technological improvements, which are difficult to quantify empirically
since they are largely unobservable, have also played a key role in boosting
commodity supply in recent years. Hence in this simple framework we treat
commodity supplies as exogenous. 1/
Commodity prices will then be determined so as to equalize existing
supply to the total demand by the two countries:
We can then form a composite demand for commodities using (4) and (5)
above. The market-clearing commodity price can then be obtained by equating
supply and (composite) demand and is given--in log terms--by the following
1/ Deaton and Laroque (1992) also assume an exogenous supply of
commodities.
In order to avoid inconvenient nonlinearities, we will assume that the
relative shares in commodity demand by the two countries remain constant,
namely:
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expression:
production in the two countries (standing for world industrial production),
and K includes constant terms and terms in the other factors of production.
Equation (8) is a partial equilibrium specification of the market for
commodities. A general equilibrium representation should specify the
endogenous determination of the supply of commodities Q, of the real
exchange rate R, and of the level of composite output IPW. 1/ These
variables will be determined jointly by aggregate demand conditions, factor
market equilibrium, government policies, etc. in the two countries and in
the countries where commodities production takes place. As shown in
Reinhart (1991), such a model yields a specification of real commodity
prices comparable to equation (8).
Having outlined the minimal structure required to link real commodity
prices to several key macroeconomic determinants, the next section will
examine the empirical relevance of the suggested framework.
IV. Empirical Results
This section proceeds as follows: first, the problems that have
characterized existing empirical models of commodity price determination are
discussed; second, the results from econometric estimation of the main
determinants of commodity prices following the general lines of the
framework developed above are presented; third, using dynamic simulations,
the out-of-sample forecasting performance of competing specifications is
evaluated; and lastly, an attempt is made to quantify how the relative
importance of the various factors has evolved over time.
1. Problems with the conventional approach
Almost all the work on commodity price determination has used a single-
equation framework. The analyses differ by the indices used, estimation
period, frequency, and exact set of right-hand-side variables. However, OLS
is the universal technique of choice.
Consider, for example, Dornbusch's examination of the commodity price-
exchange rate linkage in Dornbusch (1985 and 1986). The basic equation
estimated is:
1/ For such a model, see Reinhart (1991).
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where, as before, IPW is a measure of industrial production in the major
industrial countries. 1/ Using first differences of the logs of the
variables, Dornbusch estimates the coefficients for industrial production
and the real exchange rate to be about 2.25 and -1.5 respectively. While
the signs are as anticipated, these estimates, as Dornbusch relates, are
troubling. Specifically, commodity prices appear to be excessively
sensitive to fluctuations in the real exchange rate. Recall that, as shown
in the previous section, the elasticity of commodity prices with respect to
the real exchange rate that clears the commodity market is given by, -(1-A),
which is between zero and one in absolute value. If the two commodity-
importing countries (or blocks of countries) are equal in size and share
the same technology, then we would expect a value closer to -0.5, rather
than the -1.5 found. 2/
This result is easily replicated. We estimated equation (9) using the
quarterly data from 1971:1 to 1992:3 for the IMF all-commodity index; OLS
techniques yield the coefficients given In Table 3. However, as noted in
the previous section, industrial production (a weighted average of y and y*)
is an endogenous variable. Further, as shown in Reinhart (1991), in a
general equilibrium setting real commodity prices and the real exchange rate
are jointly determined, so the real exchange rate is also not an appropriate
right-hand-side variable. Therefore, a specification such as (9) estimated
by OLS suffers from simultaneity bias. Further, the omission of a commodity
supply measure and the possible mismeasurement of aggregate demand (as
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union are excluded from previous studies) suggests
a fundamental misspecification problem. Not surprisingly, the parameter
estimates are unreliable.
To illustrate the simultaneity bias problem we perform the Hausman
test for contemporaneous correlation (for a discussion see Learner (1985)).
The real exchange rate, Rt, can be decomposed into two parts: a prediction
generated by an auxiliary regression using variables known to be strictly
exogenous (therefore uncorrelated with the error term) and all else. 3/
Simultaneity bias would appear as a correlation between the residuals
from the auxiliary regression and the residuals of the structural equation.
1/ As noted earlier, the real exchange rate of the U.S. dollar is
included to correct for the fact that commodity prices are measured by a
dollar-denominated index and deflated by a dollar-denominated price index,
whereas the relevant measure for the non-U.S. industrial countries is the
price of commodities relative to the price of their output.
2/ The share of the United States in the total trade of primary
commodity-exporting countries with industrial countries is about equal in
size to the share of 13-country "bloc" used in the empirical work.
3/ The instrument set used for this exercise is described at the bottom
of Table 4.
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Table 3. Determinants of the Real Commodity Price:
"Conventional" Demand-driven Model 1/
1971:1-1992:3
Constant IPWt Rt R2 D.W.
Term
- 0 .
( - 4 .
02
22)
1
(5
.99
.28)
-1
( -3
.52
.40)
0.38 1.91
1/ Definitions of all the variables appear in the Data appendix. First
differences of log levels are used for all variables. The above equations
include two lags for production and the real exchange rate. The numbers in
parentheses are t statistics.
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Or, as Hausman has shown (Hausman (1978)), if the actual variable is
significant in a regression that includes both the actual and the
projection, then simultaneity bias is present.
The results are presented in Table 4. As anticipated, the inclusion
of an instrumental projection for the real exchange rate in a specification
such as (9) did not eliminate the significance of the real exchange rate,
indicating the presence of simultaneity bias. Hence, the implausible
parameter estimates shown in Table 3 follow from an invalid inference
resulting from the wrong estimation strategy. In the remainder of this
section, simultaneity is dealt with by an estimation strategy that treats
all the right-hand-side variables as potentially endogenous.
However, implausible parameter estimates are not the only problem
associated with this model. The empirical performance, as gauged by its
forecasting performance out-of-sample, deteriorates considerably after 1984
as already noted by Morrison and Wattleworth (1987). In Chart 2 the dynamic
forecasts from the estimation of equation (9) are plotted under the label
"model 1". As is evident from Chart 2, after 1984 this model loses track of
the evolution of commodity prices; specifically, there is a systematic
overprediction that continues to the present. The decline in commodity
prices in the early 1980s was accompanied by recession in several industrial
countries and a strong appreciation of the dollar (factors captured in the
demand-driven model). Similarly, during the 1983-84 the rebound in economic
activity in most industrial countries would predict a recovery in commodity
prices. However, during the years that follow there is a sharp depreciation
in the real exchange rate of the dollar and growth remains strong, both of
these factors would suggest a rebound in real commodity prices. Commodity
prices do recover by a modest 13.5 percent in the 1986-89. However, as
Chart 2 illustrates, the predicted recovery in that same period is
27 percent, far exceeding the actual experience. The overprediction
persists through 1992, highlighting the importance of some of the omitted
variables.
In what follows, we assess the empirical relevance of two key omitted
variables. Specifically, we examine the role of commodity supply in
affecting commodity prices, and the impact of the decline in demand from
the FSU.
2. The expansion of supply
As argued above, the large expansion in commodity exports in the 1980s
suggests the presence of strong supply side forces in commodity markets.
To proxy for supply developments, we incorporate the volume of primary
commodities imported by the industrial countries as a determinant of the
price equation, in a manner analogous to equation (8) in section III. As
noted earlier, to counter the possible endogeneity bias introduced in the
regression by the supply variable, the supply variable was also instrumented
out, using lagged values of this variable as instruments. The estimated
equation is the following:
Table 4. The Hausman Test for Simultaneity 1/
1971:1-1992:3
Constant IPWt Rt Instrument R2 D.W.
Term for Rt
-0.02 2.07 -0.73 0.61 0.42 1.85
(-2.72) (5.56) (-3.93) (1.97)
1/ As before, first differences of log levels are used for all variables.
The above equations include two lags for industrial production and the real
exchange rate. The variables used to construct an instrument for the real
exchange rate are: its own lagged values, current and lagged values of world
production, the real United States fiscal deficit, and real oil prices (see
Data appendix for details). The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
